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Abstract 
 
This paper presents the empirical results of a questionnaire among Dutch commuters regularly 
experiencing congestion, asking for their opinion (in terms of acceptance) on road pricing measures and 
revenue use targets. We find that road pricing is in general not very acceptable and that revenue use is 
important for the explanation of the level of acceptance. Road pricing is more acceptable when revenues 
are used to replace existing car taxation or to lower fuel taxes. Moreover, personal characteristics of the 
respondent have an impact on support levels. Higher educated people, as well as respondents with a 
higher value of time and with higher perceived effectiveness of the measure, seem to find road pricing 
measures more acceptable than other people. When we ask directly for the acceptability of different types 
of revenue use (not part of a road pricing measure), again abolition of existing car (ownership) taxes 
receives most support whereas the general budget is not acceptable. 
 
Keywords: Road pricing; Revenue use; Public acceptance. 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Road transport is known to generate considerable external costs, in particular in the 
form of congestion, accidents and noise. Governments may use different types of 
measures to deal with these problems, pricing being one of them. Most countries use a 
number of coarse pricing mechanisms, such as fuel duties, registration fees and parking 
charges. This current charging regime, however, is not very efficient. Economists have 
advocated the use of more targeted pricing tools for a long time, and have demonstrated 
the welfare gains. Nevertheless, these more efficient road pricing measures have up till 
now only seldom been implemented in practice. The low level of implementation is 
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nowadays not so much caused by technical or administrative problems. It is generally 
acknowledged that pricing measures meet public resistance and that acceptability is one 
of the major barriers to successful implementation of new and more efficient pricing 
measures (MC-ICAM, 2003).  
Transport pricing schemes have the double consequence of discouraging transport 
use, at least at certain times on certain parts of the network, and of transferring cash 
from private persons to other (often public) funds. The fact that road pricing – at least 
before recycling of revenues – involves such a transfer of cash from private travelers to 
public institutions, is likely to be a major impediment to its public acceptability. 
Furthermore, the implementation of efficient road pricing policies typically affects 
equity in a way that policy makers and/or the general population are likely to disapprove 
of.  
The Netherlands has a long experience in developing new road pricing proposals to 
reduce the increasing levels of congestion. None of these plans has ever been 
implemented mainly due to low levels of public acceptance. It is therefore interesting to 
investigate the issue of acceptance of road pricing and use of revenues in this country. 
This paper reports on the acceptability of new road pricing measures among Dutch 
commuters experiencing congestion on a regular basis. The aim is to identify 
explanatory factors for acceptance levels, especially among a group that relatively often 
uses road space.  
This paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses the previous literature on the 
acceptance of road pricing and the role of revenue use in this. Many public concerns can 
be identified which policy makers should take into account when thinking about 
implementation of road pricing. Section 3 outlines the empirical survey conducted, and 
presents the results from our data analysis. Section 4 concludes. 
 
 
2. Acceptability and revenue use in literature 
 
A regulator may face different types of constraints ranging from practical (and 
technical) ones to institutional and acceptability constraints (see for an overview on 
barriers, Ubbels and Verhoef, 2004) that may prevent him designing and implementing 
the desired pricing scheme. At present the major barriers to the successful 
implementation of transport pricing strategies relate largely to lack of stakeholder and 
political acceptability, rather than to technical or administrative problems. Since raising 
prices is generally disliked by the respective user group, the acceptance of pricing 
policies is often low. But pricing also generates revenues, which one can use for many 
purposes, including influencing the public acceptability of pricing. In this section we 
discuss literature results on the acceptance of road pricing and revenue use.  
 
 
2.1 Acceptability and road pricing 
 
Public acceptability of transport pricing measures is generally low when compared 
with other type of transport measures such as an improvement of public transport (e.g. 
Bartley, 1995; Jones, 1998). Least accepted are generally all kinds of road user fees 
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(Schade, 2003). The level of acceptance is related to the perception of road pricing. 
Public concerns often mentioned include (Jones, 1998): 
 
• It is difficult for drivers to accept the notion that they should pay for congestion, it 
seems irrational and inappropriate; 
• Car users feel that urban road pricing is not needed, roads are a publicly provided 
good that should be free at the point of use; 
• Pricing will not lessen congestion, it is an ineffective measure because drivers will 
be inelastic to road charges; 
• The measure will result in unacceptable privacy issues; 
• Road pricing will face implementation problems such as unreliable technology and 
boundary issues; 
• Road pricing is considered to be unfair. 
 
This list of concerns suggests that acceptance is not necessarily very negative; it 
depends on various aspects that can be influenced by policy makers. Verhoef (1996), for 
instance, asked morning peak road users about their opinion on road pricing. An 
overwhelming majority (83%) stated that his or her opinion depends on the allocation of 
revenues. Revenue use will be addressed in the next subsection. The level of acceptance 
may also be explained by charge levels; higher charges are generally less acceptable. 
Other factors, not directly linked to the measure itself, may also be important. Steg 
(2003) identifies several factors that affect the acceptability of transport pricing. 
People’s problem awareness, the attitude towards car driving, mobility-related social 
norms and the perceived effectiveness of the measure are identified as important in 
explaining the level of support. In addition, Rienstra et al. (1999) find that the 
acceptance of policy measures increases if people are more convinced about the 
effectiveness of such measures.  
Acceptability of road pricing also depends on personal features such as age and 
income. Following economic theory, it is to be expected that high income earners may 
be less opposed to price measures to reduce congestion than people with lower incomes, 
because their value of time is higher. Verhoef et al. (1997) do indeed find that income as 
well as the willingness to pay for time gains has a significant and positive impact on the 
opinion on road pricing. Other factors, such as the expectation to be compensated, the 
perception of congestion as a problem and trip length, are also important in explaining 
the public’s opinion. Rienstra et al. (1999) have analysed the support (together with 
perceived effectiveness and problem perception) for transport policy measures in 
general (not in particular for road pricing). They find that several personal features and 
the perceived effectiveness have a significant impact on the respondent’s support for 
policy measures in transport. While gender and type of household do not seem to have 
an impact on support levels for transport measures, these tend to be higher when the 
educational level and age becomes higher. Car and driving licence owners support 
transport measures significantly less. Of all measures, car drivers have the least support 
for price measures. The authors find no significant impact of the level of income on the 
support for price measures. 
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2.2 Acceptability and the use of revenues 
 
The Verhoef (1996) study already indicated the importance of revenue use for the 
level of acceptance. There are various options how to use the revenues. Revenues may 
remain in the road sector by highway investment or road maintenance. Funds may also 
be used for broader objectives such as the improvement of public transport or a 
reduction of income taxes. Research has addressed the popularity of revenue spending 
objectives. Verhoef (1996) found that the allocation objectives that are in the direct 
interest of the road users received most support, as may be expected. Road investments, 
together with lower fuel and vehicle taxes (‘variabilisation’) received the highest 
average score. General purposes, such as general tax reductions and the government 
budget in general, obtained least support from morning peak road users. In between 
were transport purposes other than road, notably public transport.  
The importance of the use of the funds in gaining or losing public acceptance for a 
pricing measure has also been shown by a survey in the UK (Jones, 1998). The attitudes 
of people to a series of measures that would reduce urban traffic problems were asked. 
When asked independently (road pricing as a stand alone measure), only 30% 
responded in support of charging road users to enter highly congested urban areas 
(Jones, 1998). The respondents were then offered a package that includes a charge on 
entering a zone that was then used to fund better public transport, traffic calming and 
better facilities for walking and cycling. This resulted in a support of 57% for the 
package. A similar result was found in particular for London. A single measure was 
supported by 43% of the public, whereas 63% accepted the scheme when revenues were 
used for purposes approved by respondents. Hypothecating revenues thus increases 
public support. 
The AFFORD study conducted an empirical survey on the public acceptability of 
different pricing strategies in four European cities: Athens, Como, Dresden and Oslo 
(Schade and Schlag, 2000). They investigated the attitudes of the respondents regarding 
how to use the revenues arising from road pricing. It was found that common purposes 
of money use like traffic flow and public transport improvements are favoured by the 
vast majority of respondents. Lowering vehicle taxes is also supported by the people, 
whereas lower income taxes is not acceptable as a revenue spending target. This is the 
way revenues should be used according to the public. The expectations concerning how 
revenues actually will be used are rather different, however. About 70% of the 
respondents expect that the money will be used for state or municipal purposes, which 
are not wanted by the public (Schade and Schlag, 2000). This study has also analysed 
factors that influence the degree of acceptability of pricing measures. In particular, 
variables such as ‘social norm’, ‘perceived effectiveness’ and ‘approval of societal 
important aims’ are positively connected with the acceptability of pricing strategies 
(Schade and Schlag, 2003).  
An interesting study by Small (1992) suggests that public and political support can be 
reached for road pricing, even without using all revenues to compensate travelers since 
higher user charges are accompanied by reduced travel times. He searched for a strategy 
that funds programs with such a variety of distributions of impacts that nearly everyone 
affected will find at least some offsetting benefits, and a majority will perceive the 
entire package as an improvement. Seven interest groups were distinguished ranging 
from traveling public and public transport users to low tax advocates. It was suggested 
to keep money in the transportation sector. Funds should be allocated about equally 
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between monetary subsidies to travelers, substitutions of general taxes now used to pay 
for transportation services, and new transportation services. Small illustrates this by 
designing a politically feasible (in terms of support from the earlier identified interest 
groups) congestion pricing package for Southern California. His equity analysis 
indicates that this program makes every class of traveler better off (combination of 
travel time saved, financial improvements and transportation improvement), with the 
greatest gains for higher income drivers and public transport users. 
However, there is a downside to using revenues solely to improve acceptability. From 
a broader perspective, it becomes important also to consider explicitly the interaction 
(or trade off) between public acceptability and efficiency. Clearly, when too easily a 
scheme were adopted so as to meet public acceptability requirements, its efficient 
properties may be undermined – even by so much that the efficiency considerations 
motivating the scheme in the first place would then call for its cancellation.  
 
3. Acceptance and revenue use in the Netherlands: results from a survey among 
car commuters 
 
3.1 Aims and data collection 
 
This paper analyses the acceptance of road pricing measures (including the use of 
revenues) by Dutch commuters who experience congestion. It is important to know 
which factors influence acceptability of road pricing. Our analysis probably comes 
closest to that of Rienstra et al. (1999) and Verhoef et al. (1997). We also identify 
factors explaining the level of acceptance of road pricing and revenue use and include 
the perceived effectiveness and the value of time of respondents into the analysis. This 
study extends on the previous work by considering multiple variants of pricing 
measures, systematically varied over dimensions such as price levels, differentiation and 
revenue use. Moreover, the individual value of time estimates are now based on a 
choice experiment, while in the Verhoef et al. questionnaire these were based on open-
ended WTP questions. We also include the value of schedule delay and uncertainty into 
the analysis. The work of Rienstra analysed the support for transport measures in 
general, we focus more specifically on road pricing measures. For that reason, our 
sample consists only of car drivers who experience congestion on a regular basis.  
The data used in this paper have been obtained by conducting an (interactive) internet 
survey among Dutch commuters. The full questionnaire can roughly be divided into 
three parts. First, we asked for some socio-economic characteristics of the respondent 
(such as education and income). In order to analyse the behavioural responses to road 
pricing we developed a stated choice experiment, which is the second part of the survey. 
And finally we asked for the opinion of the respondents on several carefully explained 
road pricing measures. The first and the second part was answered by 1115 respondents, 
whereas the latter sample (opinion questions) consisted of 564 respondents. This paper 
will present outcomes of the analysis of this latter part of the survey.  
The data collection was executed by a specialised firm (NIPO), which has a panel of 
over 50.000 respondents. Since the survey was aimed at respondents that use a car for 
their home to work journey and also face congestion on a regular basis, we selected 
working respondents, who drive to work by car two or more times per week, and who 
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experience congestion of 10 or more minutes for at least two times a week. This resulted 
in a total of about 6800 possible respondents. An initial analysis revealed that a random 
sample would result in a relatively low number of women and lower income groups. 
Because income differences are important to analyse, it was decided to ‘over sample’ 
the lower income groups and create an equal number of respondents over the various 
income classes. The data were collected during three weeks in June 2004 (before 
summer holidays).  
 
 
3.2 Survey 
 
As previously explained, the survey started with some general questions asking for 
important explanatory variables of the respondent. These variables may help explain the 
differences in acceptance levels. Most variables are explained in Appendix 1. 
Additional variables included in our analysis are not socio-economic in nature. We have 
information on the perceived effectiveness of the measures, and have an estimate of the 
value of time (VOT) of the respondent. It is worthwhile to analyse the effects of these 
variables on acceptance1.  
Appendix 1 shows the profile of our sample. Apparently Dutch commuters 
experiencing congestion are in most cases men and relatively highly educated. A 
majority of the respondents are between 26 and 45 years old and do not have children. 
These characteristics of our data base have been compared with the general profile of 
the Dutch car driver experiencing congestion, in order to check representativeness. 
Research by Goudappel Coffeng (1997) suggests that about 75% of all drivers in 
congestion are men (equal to our sample). Our sample includes more respondents 
between the age of 26 and 35 (about 10% more), whereas the share of persons older 
than 45 years is lower than the 1997 profile. Moreover, drivers in congestion tend to be 
higher educated (our sample consists of 44.1% Bachelor’s and Master’s, whereas the 
general profile has 36%) and have a higher income. The effect of the ‘over sampling’ of 
lower income is clearly present. About 25% of the drivers in this sample have an 
income below €28,500 (modal income), whereas the 1997 profile predicts that only 8% 
of the drivers fall in this category. 
The respondent was confronted with three different types of road pricing measures. 
After a concise description of each measure, the respondents’ opinion on various issues 
was asked. People could indicate the acceptability of a specific measure on a 7-point 
scale, ranging from ‘very unacceptable’ to ‘very acceptable’. We also asked how 
effective they thought that the measure would be, both individually (i.e. would you 
drive less?) and in general terms (would there be less congestion and will there be 
smaller environmental problems?). The answers to these latter questions (also on a 7-
point scale) have been included into the analysis as explanatory variables for the level of 
acceptance. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 We do not only have an estimate of the VOT of the respondent, also the value of schedule delay (early 
and late) and the value of uncertainty are available. We refer to Appendix 3 for more information on the 
derivation of these values. 
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Table 1: Short description of the transport pricing measures presented to the respondents. 
Measure Variant 
1: Bottleneck passage 1A: flat toll throughout the week 
1B: coarse toll (flat within peak hours on working days) 
1C: multi-step toll during peak hours only 
1D: toll depends on actual traffic conditions 
 
2: Kilometre charge differentiated by vehicle type 2A: Revenues to general budget 
2B: Revenues to traffic system 
2C: Lower car taxation and new roads 
2D: Revenues to public transport 
2E: Abolition of car ownership taxes 
2F: Lower fuel taxes 
2G: Revenues to improve and construct new roads 
 
3: Kilometre charge with different charge levels 
and different revenue use 
3A: 2.5 €cents, unclear revenue use 
3B: 5 €cents, unclear revenue use 
3C: 7.5 €cents, unclear revenue use 
3D: 2.5 €cents, improvement of road network 
3E: 5 €cents, improvement of road network 
3F: 7.5 €cents, improvement of road network 
3G: 2.5 €cents, abolish existing car taxation 
3H: 5 €cents, abolish existing car taxation 
3I: 7.5 €cents, abolish existing car taxation 
 
Within each type of measure, we have developed a number of variants differing on: 
type of charge (measure 1), type of revenue use (measure 2) and level of charge plus 
revenue use (measure 3) (see Table 1). This resulted in 4 different variants for measure 
1, 7 for measure 2, and 9 for measure 3 (a detailed description can be found in 
Appendix 2).  
All variants were randomly distributed over the respondents. This means that we 
obtained about 140 observations for each variant of measure 1, 80 for each variant of 
measure 2, and 60 for each variant of measure 3. A short introduction preceded the 
explanation of the measures. This was to explain that the respondent had to imagine the 
implementation of the measures in the Netherlands. It was also to be assumed that the 
privacy of car users is guaranteed, electronic equipment registers the toll and the driver 
can freely choose the payment method (e.g. credit card, bank transfer, etc.). The 
introduction to measure 2 and 3 (time-independent charges) also included an estimation 
of the financial consequences for an average driver (driving 16,000 km in a year), 
irrespective of type of revenue use. 
In addition, we asked the respondents to evaluate the acceptance of different revenue 
uses separately (without specifying the road pricing measure). Six different revenue use 
options were presented to the respondent: the treasury of the government (and hence be 
used for purposes other than transport); new roads; improvement of public transport 
(e.g. increase of frequencies); a removal of existing car ownership taxes; a decrease in 
fuel taxation; and a decrease of income taxes. Again, for each option, a 7-point 
acceptability scale was used. 
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3.3 Methodology and results 
 
Before investigating the distribution of the levels of acceptance we start with an 
overview of the average acceptance levels for each single measure. Figure 1 shows the 
mean acceptance outcomes and its confidence intervals2.  
 
Figure 1: Mean and 95% confidence intervals of acceptance scores on each single measure (level 1 = very 
unacceptable; level 7 = very acceptable). 
 
The mean level of acceptance differs considerably between the various types of 
measures. Where all types of measure 1 (bottleneck passage tolls) can be classified as 
somewhat unacceptable, this is not always the case for the other measures. In particular 
measures 2C (revenue use: new roads and less car taxation), 2E (abandoning of road 
taxation) and 2F (lower fuel taxes) have higher acceptance levels. But, a score of 4 still 
means that the respondents are neutral. The patterns of outcomes for measure 3 can be 
easily explained by the structure of the measure (a combination of 3 different charge 
levels with 3 different revenue use options). Apparently the respondents prefer revenues 
to be used for abolition of car taxation over that of new road and an unclear destination. 
A charge of 2.5 €cents is more acceptable than higher charges of 5 and 7.5 €cents, as 
may be expected. Measure 3G has the highest mean (4.7) which comes close to an 
average score of 5 (‘somewhat acceptable’).  
These findings suggest the following interesting issues. First, given the results for 
measure 1 it seems that the level of acceptability does not depend on the complexity of 
the measure. Hence, acceptability is not necessarily a reason for starting simple. Second, 
measure 3 suggests that revenue use has more effect on the level of acceptance than the 
charge level (for the chosen range). People prefer a charge of 7.5 €cents with 
abolishment of car taxation over a charge of 2.5 €cents with revenues hypothecated to 
the general treasury. This underlines the importance of the allocation of the revenues. 
                                                 
2 We present ‘unweighted’ results. When we correct the outcomes for representativeness (on age, 
education and income) to obtain a good match with the profile of Goudappel Coffeng and create a 
‘weighted’ sample, we find comparable results.   
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Appendix 4A shows the percentages of respondents that find the various measures 
‘unaccaptable’ or ‘very unacceptable’. These outcomes confirm the previous described 
‘mean’ pattern. For instance, measure 3C is least acceptable, not only on average but 
also in terms of number of respondents.  
 
 
Methodology for assessing differences between groups 
 
Various econometric techniques are of course available that can be used to investigate 
the relation between various variables. The methodology to be applied depends to a 
large extent on the structure of the data. Here, the aim is first to explain the level of 
acceptance for the various measures, where the dependent variable consists of a choice 
out of an ordered set of acceptance alternatives. Given this framework, the ordered 
probit (OP) technique seems to be most appropriate (see for discussion of OP Maddala 
(1983)). Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), which assumes an unbounded continuous 
dependent variable, is less appropriate, although it would have had the advantage of 
more easily interpretable coefficients.  
The underlying response model for an OP estimation is of the following form (see 
Davidson and MacKinnon, 1993): 
 
.'* εβ += iXACC   
 
The underlying continuous response variable ACC* is unobserved, X is the vector of 
explanatory variables, β gives the vector of coefficients, and ε is the residual. The 
observed discrete response variable ACC is related to ACC* as follows: 
 
  1=ACC  if 1* µ≤ACC ,  
  2=ACC  if 21 * µµ <≤ ACC , 
3=ACC  if 32 * µµ <≤ ACC , 
: 
  7=ACC  if *6 ACC≤µ . 
 
The µ’s (threshold values in the model output) are unknown parameters to be 
estimated jointly with β, and the model assumes that ε is normally distributed across 
observations. The constants µ therefore divide the domain of ACC* into 7 segments, 
which corresponds with observations of the discrete response variable. The model 
estimates probability intervals for the seven possible answers: 
 
Prob )'()'()( 1 ijijij XXJZ βµβµ −Φ−−Φ== −  
 
where Φ is the cumulative standard normal, and Zij=J represents each acceptability 
score. The interpretation of the estimated coefficients is not straightforward. The 
estimated coefficients for the included explanatory variables can be interpreted as 
indications of shifting the distribution to the left or the right depending on the sign of 
the β’s. Assuming that β is positive, this means that that the probability of the leftmost 
category (in this case ACC=1) must decline. At the same time we are shifting some 
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probability into the rightmost cell (ACC=7). But what happens to the middle cells is 
ambiguous and is dependent on the local densities. Hence, we must be very careful in 
interpreting the coefficients in this model (see Greene, 1993). The values of the 
coefficients can more easily be interpreted in a relative sense: a larger value denotes a 
larger marginal impact.  
Various specifications of the model for all measures (by including variables that may 
be expected to have some explanatory power) have been tried. The following tables 
present our preferred specifications. The estimations for each type of measure have been 
done with the same explanatory variables, to maximise comparability between the 
models.  
 
 
Measure 1: Electronic toll on daily bottlenecks with fixed revenue use (new roads) 
 
Appendix 6A presents the estimation results for measure 1. The first row presents the 
estimates for the threshold values (µ’s). The second row presents all the explanatory 
variables that have been included in the estimation. It appears that the individual’s value 
of time, level of education, and compensation of costs by the employer all have a 
significant and positive impact on acceptance. Most signs of the coefficients are as 
expected. For example, respondents with higher value of time tend to have higher 
acceptance levels of an electronic toll on daily bottlenecks. Interestingly, inclusion of 
the individual’s value of schedule delay (early and late) and the value of uncertainty did 
not lead to significant results. This suggests that people find it hard to predict whether or 
not uncertainty will reduce under congestion pricing, and whether or not advantages in 
terms of schedule delay costs can be realized. Alternatively, people may have ignored 
these matters. 
As expected, commuters who have to pay the toll themselves (no compensation) and 
drive many kilometres tend to find the measure less acceptable than drivers who receive 
full compensation and use the car less often. Income is not significant; one explanation 
may be that VOT and education (both correlated with income) take up the expected 
effect. Income indeed becomes significant (at the 5% level) when VOT and education 
are not included in the estimation. On the other hand, the type of measure, living in one 
of the three larger cities (loc1, included to compare the opinions of people located in 
densely urbanised areas with those in the rest of the Netherlands) and the weight of the 
car do not seem to have an important impact.  
As already apparent from Figure 1, the different types of bottleneck charging 
measures have no significant effect on the acceptance of the respondent. It makes no 
difference whether it is a charge at all times (1A), a peak time charge (1B), a 
differentiated peak charge (1C) or a charge based on actual traffic conditions (1D), 
although the latter seems somewhat less acceptable than the other three (although not 
significantly). This suggests that the structure of measure (ranging from a flat and 
certain charge to a highly uncertain charge depending on traffic density) may not 
necessarily have an impact on the level of acceptance. 
The perceived level of ‘general effectiveness’ in terms of (less) congestion (i.e. in 
Appendix 6A general effectiveness (less congestion)) has an important impact on 
acceptance3. The results suggest that respondents who think that the measure will be 
                                                 
3 The type of measure that has been proposed has no significant impact on the level of general 
effectiveness (in terms of less congestion). 
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effective also tend to find it more acceptable. The effectiveness in terms of less 
environmental problems is not included in the model as this variable was highly 
correlated with ‘effectiveness (less congestion)’. The ‘personal effectiveness’ 
(indicating whether people tend to use their car less when the measure is implemented) 
shows a somewhat irregular pattern. Compared with people who indicate that they do 
not change their behaviour (peff=1), respondents who find a personal change more 
likely have a higher level of acceptance. This may be explained by the ‘protest voters’ 
in group 1: “the measure is not acceptable because I will not change behaviour” or “I 
say I will not change behaviour because I don’t want this measure implemented”. An 
explanation of the low score of peff=7 may be that these respondents (who indicate that 
they will most likely drive less) find the measure not that acceptable because they 
perceive the consequences of changing behaviour as (very) negative.  
The results suggest that acceptance need not depend on the complexity of the road 
pricing measure. This gives possibilities to policy makers to consider time-differentiated 
charges that tend to be more effective in reducing congestion. The perception of 
effectiveness also seems very important for the level of acceptance. Clearly explaining 
the objectives and expected effects may therefore be an important aspect of the 
communication strategy of the government. 
 
 
Measure 2: Kilometre charge dependent on vehicle weight with different revenue use  
 
Appendix 6B shows the estimation results for the second measure. Again, we see the 
importance of the VOT and compensation of costs by the employer. Education is not as 
important as for measure 1. One explanation may be that measure 2 (like 3) is more 
easily accepted on the basis of equity arguments, which require less intellectual effort 
than effectiveness or efficiency. A striking difference with the previous estimation is the 
difference between the (sub-) types of measure. Measures C, E and F received 
significantly more support than measure G, but also than the other 3 variants of this 
measure. This suggests that when revenues from the charge are used to lower or 
abandon existing car taxation (2B and 2E) or fuel taxes (2F), more public support is 
obtained. The weight of the car (and also the number of kilometres driven yearly) does 
not have a significant impact, despite the fact that this measure differentiates on this 
characteristic. Again, perceived general effectiveness in terms of congestion and 
personal effectiveness have a significant impact on the level of acceptance. We have 
included the effectiveness in terms of less congestion into the estimation and not the 
effectiveness on the environment despite its possible relevance here. These two 
variables are again strongly correlated and have equal results in terms of significance. 
The mean score on environmental effectiveness is only slightly higher than the 
perceived effectiveness on congestion (it is not “very probable” that congestion will 
decrease or that the environment will benefit from this measure). Given the nature of 
this measure, a greater difference might have been expected. Personal effectiveness 
shows almost the same (irregular) pattern that we found for measure 1, and again the 
same hypothesis applies here. 
The analysis indicates that (as expected) revenue use is an important explanatory 
variable for the acceptance level. Revenue allocations that are in the direct interest of 
the individual are more popular. This confirms the findings of other studies such as 
Verhoef (1996). Characteristics of individual specific (mobility) behaviour tend to be of 
European Transport \ Trasporti Europei  n. 32 (2006): 69-94 
 80
less relevance, except for the value of time. The perceived level of effectiveness of the 
measure by the respondents is important (as also confirmed by the results of Steg 
(2003).  
 
 
Measure 3: Kilometre charge with different toll levels and revenue uses  
 
The third measure that we have analysed consists of 9 sub-measures that combine one 
out of three types of revenue use with one out of three levels of a charge. Two sets of 
dummy variables thus define the type of measure: one for the type of revenue use and 
one for the level of the charge. Appendix 6C shows the results for this estimation. It is 
interesting to see that the level of acceptance very much depends on the way revenues 
are redistributed, and (but less so, for the values considered) the level of the charge (as 
may be expected). Higher charges are relatively less acceptable, and the abolition of 
existing car taxes is far more acceptable than an unclear revenue use (note the high 
coefficient), and somewhat more acceptable than the construction of new roads. This is 
consistent with finding that measure 3G (combination of low charge and abandoning of 
existing car taxes) is relatively most acceptable (confirmed by the results shown in 
Figure 1). It is remarkable that the weight of the vehicle has an explanatory impact here. 
This may have something to do with the fact that the previous measure 2 was 
differentiated according to weight. In indicating acceptance respondents may have 
compared measure 3 with that measure; and therefore people with smaller cars now find 
this measure less acceptable. Expected effectiveness again has a very significant impact 
on the level of acceptance. Commuters who indicate that the measure will be effective 
are less opposed to this measure. The respondents’ value of time, education and 
personal effectiveness seem to lose importance compared with the other measures. In 
contrast to the previous measures, personal effectiveness is no longer significant. It is 
not clear what causes these differences with the previous cases. 
The predictability of the charge level and the complexity of the measure may not be 
important (see measure 1), but the level of the charge and the revenue use is relevant. 
Individual characteristics are less important in explaining the level of acceptance. The 
differences between groups are small, which makes it difficult for governments to 
specify certain groups that may be compensated to increase acceptance.  
 
 
Revenue use only 
 
Finally, we asked the respondents for their opinion on the allocation categories of the 
revenues per se, so without defining the road pricing measure. Six different possibilities 
were evaluated on acceptance by the respondents (general budget, new roads, improve 
public transport, abandon existing car taxation, lower fuel taxes, and lower income 
taxes). The findings presented in Figure 2 are largely in line with the previous findings 
of revenue use as part of a road pricing measure. An abolition of existing car taxes is 
most preferred (a mean score of 5.85, a 6 is ‘acceptable’), whereas the general budget is 
‘unacceptable’. The construction of new roads is valued rather positively here, while the 
acceptability of measure 2G (kilometre charge with the same type of revenue use) is 
considerably lower (see Figure 1). More than 74% of the respondents indicated that the 
general budget is ‘unacceptable’ or ‘very unacceptable’ (see Appendix 4a). The 
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confidence intervals are smaller than those of the road pricing measures (see Figure 1), 
indicating less variance in the answers.  
Figure 2: Mean and 95% confidence intervals of acceptance scores on each type of revenue use (level 1 = 
very unacceptable; level 7 = very acceptable). 
 
We have carried out a similar type of (ordered probit) analysis as we did for the road 
pricing measures, in order to explain the acceptance levels for these types of revenue 
use. When policy makers want to compensate certain groups, it is useful for them to 
know the preferences of these groups. The estimations of the preferred results can be 
found in Appendix 5. Again, for each type of revenue use the same explanatory 
variables have been included after having tried various specifications of the model (by 
including and excluding variables that may be expected to have some explanatory 
power).  
The results differ greatly over the various types of revenue use. Income is only 
significant when revenues are used to lower income taxes or to construct new roads. 
Lower income groups dislike revenues to be used for new roads more than people with 
a higher income, whereas the opposite holds when revenues are used to lower income 
taxes. The explanation for the first finding could be that lower income people drive less. 
For the second finding, the higher marginal utility could be an explanation. Hence, 
when policy makers propose to compensate the lowest income groups by lowering 
income taxes they obtain most support from this category (although overall support 
levels for this type of measure are rather modest). Another interesting variable is the 
compensation of costs by the employer. As may be expected, respondents who are not 
or only partly compensated have in general more support for abolition of existing car 
taxation than people who do not have to pay these taxes. This may also explain the 
disapproval of revenues being used for the general budget by people without full 
compensation; personal compensation is a better objective for this group. The weight of 
the vehicle seems important for two targets: lower fuel taxes and improvement of public 
transport. Owners of smaller vehicles (with lower weights) find lower fuel taxes less 
acceptable than others, this may be explained by the fact that this group drives relatively 
more fuel efficiently and consequently benefits less than people with large (and heavy) 
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cars. The importance of the VOT for certain allocation categories (i.e. general budget 
and improvement of public transport) seems somewhat strange and inexplicable. 
The findings on acceptance for revenue use targets are similar to earlier reported 
results in the literature. The allocation objectives that are in the direct interest of the 
road users receive most support. Improvement of public transport is less acceptable in 
comparison with the findings of Schade and Schlag (2000). Revenues may theoretically 
ideally be used to reduce distortive income taxes (which is beneficial from a welfare 
perspective), but support for this option from Dutch commuters is low.  
 
 
4. Concluding remarks 
 
Despite the fact that politicians and the public regard transport problems as very 
urgent and important, people do have concerns about road pricing, often resulting in low 
acceptance levels. The outcomes from a survey among Dutch commuters analysed in 
this paper confirm this scepticism. The first measure that has been evaluated by the 
respondents (electronic toll differing according to place and/or time without changing 
revenue use) is in general (for all alternatives) perceived as somewhat unacceptable, 
irrespective of the type (or alternative) of measure. The acceptance of second measure 
(a kilometre charge depending on vehicle weight combined with different allocation of 
revenues) does depend on the type of measure. This indicates that the respondents’ 
opinions on road pricing are very sensitive to the way tax revenues are allocated. The 
measure is more acceptable when revenues are used for a decrease in fuel taxes, an 
abolishment of existing car taxation or to lower existing car ownership taxes together 
with the construction of new roads; indeed those targets that are in the direct interest of 
the respondent (car driver). These findings correspond with results from the third 
measure. It is also found that higher charges are less acceptable.  
Most of our findings are in line with results of previous literature. For the first two 
measures (and to a lesser extent also for measure 3) it was found that education, the 
VOT of the respondents and financial compensation (partly or full) by the employer are 
important explanatory variables. Higher educated people, as well as respondents with a 
higher VOT, seem to find road pricing measures more acceptable than others. The same 
holds for people that receive financial support for their commuting costs. The perceived 
effectiveness of the measure (in terms of less congestion) does have an important 
(positive) impact on the support levels. Finally, we found a weaker relationship, an 
inverted U, between personal effectiveness and support levels.  
The analysis of measure 1 showed that the complexity of a measure does not affect 
the levels of acceptance. The structure of this measure was varied (with different toll 
structures when passing a bottleneck), while revenue allocation was kept constant. This 
may suggest that policy makers can consider more efficient differentiated pricing 
schemes instead of a rather simple flat fee in dealing with bottleneck congestion, 
without loosing acceptance. We have also included the value of schedule delay (early 
and late) and the value of uncertainty of respondents into the analysis of these measures. 
The results do not confirm that these individual indicators are important in explaining 
acceptance. Despite the hypothesised impact of variables such as income, the driven 
number of kilometers and weight of the car (with measure 2), we haven’t found 
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evidence on this. The effect of income seems to be fully captured by education and the 
value of time.  
The above findings on revenue use targets are largely confirmed when we do not 
present the type of measure, and ask directly for the acceptance of various ways to 
redistribute the revenues. Dutch car commuters find it almost acceptable when policy 
makers decide to use the revenues to compensate the car drivers by abandoning current 
car taxation. This option outperforms all other destinations in terms of acceptance. 
Lower fuel taxes and new roads are slightly less acceptable. By far the least attractive 
option is the public treasury. The analysis towards explaining variables of these revenue 
use targets showed a very diverse pattern. For some allocation categories (lower income 
taxes and new roads) income was important, whereas for other spending targets 
compensation of costs by the employer (e.g. abandoning existing car taxation) and the 
weight of the vehicle (e.g. lower fuel taxes) appeared to have impact on acceptance. 
Income seems the most relevant variable in this case because equity is often an issue 
when it comes to implementation of pricing measures and policy makers may want to 
compensate the lower income groups. It appears that lower income groups have a 
stronger preference to lower existing income taxes with revenues from road pricing 
compared with higher income people. The opposite holds when revenues are used to 
construct new roads. 
 
 
Acknowledgement 
 
This research was carried out within the NWO/Connekt VEV project on “A 
Multidisciplinay Study of Pricing Policies in Transport”; nr. 014-34-351. Financial 
support is gratefully acknowledged.  
 
 
References 
 
AVV (Adviesdienst Verkeer en Vervoer) (2006) Value of Time Personenvervoer, Auto per Motief, 
http://www.rws-avv.nl/pls/portal30/docs/12795.PDF, accessed March 29, 2006. 
Bartley, B. (1995) “Traffic demand management options in Europe: the MIRO project”, Traffic 
Engineering and Control, 95, pp. 596-603. 
Davidson, R. and MacKinnon, J. G. (1993) Estimation and Inference in Econometrics, Oxford University 
Press, New York. 
Greene, W. H. (1993) Econometric Analysis, 2nd edition, Macmillan Publishing Company, New York. 
Goudappel, C. (1997) Marktprofiel van de filerijder, rapport in opdracht van Advie4sdienst Verkeer en 
Vervoer, Deventer. 
Jones, P. (1998) “Urban Road Pricing: Public Acceptability and Barriers to Implementation”, in: Road 
pricing, traffic congestion and the environment: Issues of efficiency and social feasibility, Button, K. J. 
and Verhoef, E. T. (eds.), pp. 263-284, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham. 
Maddala, G. S. (1983) Limited-Dependent and Qualitative Variables in Econometrics, Cambridge 
University Press, New York. 
MC-ICAM (2003) Pricing of Urban and Interurban Road Transport: Barriers, Constraints and 
Implementation Paths, Deliverable 4 of the MC-ICAM project funded by the European Commission, 
Leeds. 
Rienstra, S. A., Rietveld, P. and Verhoef, E. T. (1999) “The social support for policy measures in 
passenger transport. A statistical analysis for the Netherlands”, Transportation Research D, Vol. 4, pp. 
181-200. 
Schade, J. (2003) “European Research Results on Transport Pricing Acceptability”, in: Acceptability of 
Transport Pricing Strategies, Schade, J. and Schlag, B. (eds.), pp. 109-123, Elsevier, Oxford. 
European Transport \ Trasporti Europei  n. 32 (2006): 69-94 
 84
Schade, J. and Schlag, B. (2000) Acceptability of Urban Transport Pricing (AFFORD publication), 
VATT research report 72, Helsinki 
Schade, J. and Schlag, B. (2003) “Acceptability of Urban Transport Pricing Strategies”, Transportation 
Research Part F, 6 (1), pp. 45-61. 
Small, K. (1992) “Using the Revenues from Congestion Pricing”, Transportation 19, pp. 359-381 
Steg, L. (2003) “Factors Influencing the Acceptability and Effectiveness of Transport Pricing”, in: 
Acceptability of Transport Pricing Strategies, Schade, J. and Schlag, B. (eds.), pp. 187-202, Elsevier, 
Oxford. 
Ubbels, B. and Verhoef, E. T. (2004) “Barriers to Transport Pricing”, In: P. Rietveld and R. Stough (eds.), 
Barriers to Sustainable Transport, Spon Press, London, pp. 69-93. 
Verhoef, E. T. (1996) Economic Efficiency and Social Feasibility in the Regulation of Road Transport 
Externalities, Thesis Publishers, Amsterdam. 
Verhoef, E. T., Nijkamp, P. and Rietveld, P. (1997) “The social feasibility of road pricing: a case study 
for the Randstad area”, Journal of Transport Economics and Policy, 31 (3), pp. 255-276. 
European Transport \ Trasporti Europei  n. 32 (2006): 69-94 
 85
Appendix 1: Explanation and population share of explanatory (dummy) variables 
of data set (N=564) 
 
Variable Type 
 
Levels 
Gender Dummy Male (75,2%); Female (24,8%) 
Age Dummies Age1: 18-25 (7,3%), Age2: 26-35 (39,7%), 
Age3: 36-45 (28,2%), Age4: 46-55 (18,1%), 
Age5: 56+ (6,7%)  
Education Dummies Edu1: primary (15,6%), Edu2: junior general 
secondary (MAVO) (6,0%), edu3: 
intermediate vocational (MBO) (24,8%), 
edu4: senior general secondary 
(HAVO/VWO) (9,4%), edu5: Bachelor 
(31,9%), edu6: Master (12,2%) 
Income (gross yearly) Continuous  
Place of residence (region) Dummies Loc1: 3 large cities* (17,9%), loc2: rest west 
(33,9), loc3: north (3,7%), loc4: east (23,9), 
loc5: south (20,6%) 
Family size Dummies Fam1: 1 person (23%), fam2: 2 (31,6%), 
fam3: 3 (18,3%), fam4: 4 (18,3%), fam5: 5 
(7,6%), fam6: 6 (1,2%)  
Number of children younger than 
11 
Dummies Childno: 0 (72,5%), childyes: 1 or more 
(27,5%) 
Type of measure  Dummies Measure 1A to 1D, 2A to 2G (see app. 2) 
Measure 3: charge level Dummies Charge=2.5 €cent, charge=5 €cent, 
charge=7.5 €cent 
Measure 3: revenue use Dummies Revenue use is unclear, revenue use is new 
roads, revenue use is abandon car taxes 
VOT Continuous  
Weight of the car Dummies Weight1: low weight (22,7%), weight2: 
middle class (67,2%), weight3: heavy (10,1%) 
Yearly number of kilometers 
driven 
Continuous  
Compensation of costs by 
employer 
Dummies Comp1: none (11,9%), comp2: partly 
(43,8%), comp3: completely (44,3) 
Travel time with congestion/free 
flow travel time 
Continuous  
General effectiveness (will this 
measure lead to less congestion)  
Dummies Geff1: very unlikely (20.4%), geff2: unlikely 
(37.4%), geff3: a little unlikely (14.4%), 
geff4: not likely, not unlikely (6.0%), geff5: a 
little likely (16.3%), geff6: likely (4.4%), 
geff7: very likely (1.1%)  
Personal effectiveness (will this 
measure make you drive less 
kilometers)  
Dummies Peff1: very unlikely (31.7%), peff2: unlikely 
(34.9%), peff3: a little unlikely (8.2%), peff4: 
not likely, not unlikely (8.3%), peff5: a little 
likely (10.1%), peff6: likely (5.3%), peff7: 
very likely (1.4%)  
* Amsterdam, Rotterdam and The Hague 
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Appendix 2: Description of measures 
 
Measure Variants 
1. Electronic toll on daily bottlenecks 
(independent of bad weather);  revenues 
hypothecated to construct new roads and 
improve existing roads 
A) charge of € 1.00 at all times 
B) charge of € 2.00 on working days, during peak 
hours: 7.00-9.00 and 17.00-19.00, no charge on 
other times 
C) peak-time charge: 6:00- 7:00 € 0.50, 
7:00-7:30 € 1.00; 7:30-8:00 € 1.75; 8:00-8:30 € 
2.50; 8:30-9:00 € 1.75; 9:00-9:30 € 1.00, 9:30-
10:00 € 0.50. The same structure for the evening 
peak (16.00-20.00)  
D) charge depends on traffic density, more congestion 
means a higher charge with a maximum of € 5,00 
 
2. Kilometre charge depending on weight of 
the car (heavy cars are less 
environmentally friendly). Light cars pay 
4 €cents per kilometre; middle weight 
cars pay 5 €cents per kilometre; heavy 
cars pay 6 €cents per kilometre. Monthly 
(extra) costs for the various types of cars 
based on average kilometrage were 
presented to respondent. 
A) Revenues hypothecated to general budget of the 
government 
B) Revenues hypothecated to the traffic system in 
general, this may include new roads or 
improvement of public transport 
C) Revenues used to lower existing car taxes and 
improve or construct new roads 
D) Revenues hypothecated to public transport 
E) Revenues used to abolish existing car ownership 
taxes 
F) Revenues used to lower existing fuel taxes 
G) Revenues used to improve roads and construct 
new road infrastructure 
 
3. Kilometre charge with different 
allocations of revenues 
A) charge of 2.5 €cents per kilometre; revenue use 
unclear 
B) charge of 5 €cents per kilometre; revenue use 
unclear 
C) charge of 7.5 €cents per kilometre; revenue use 
unclear 
D) charge of 2.5 €cents per kilometre; revenues used 
for new and better roads 
E) charge of 5 €cents per kilometre; revenues used for 
new and better roads 
F) charge of 7.5 €cents per kilometre; revenues used 
for new and better roads 
G) charge of 2.5 €cents per kilometre; revenues used 
to abolish existing car taxes (ownership and 
purchase) 
H) charge of 5 €cents per kilometre; revenues used to 
abolish existing car taxes (ownership and 
purchase) 
I) charge of 7,5 €cents per kilometre; revenues used 
to abolish existing car taxes (ownership and 
purchase) 
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Appendix 3: Calculation of VOT, VSDL, VSDE and VUNC point estimates 
 
The value of time (VOT), value of schedule delay late (VSDL) and early (VSDE) and 
value of uncertainty (VUNC) were derived from questions posed in the stated choice 
experiment, aimed at establishing estimates at the individual level. Four different 
screens were designed fo this purpose (one for each variable), each offering four 
alternatives that differ in tolls, travel time, departure time and uncertainty (only in the 
screen for VUNC). The respondents were then asked to allocate ten (commuting) trips 
over these four different alternatives. The design of the alternatives for VOT, VSDE, 
VSDL and VUNC respectively has been created as follows.  
The VOT for commuting trips in the Netherlands, as used by the Dutch government 
for 2004, was about € 8.3 per hour (see AVV, 2006). Given this value, we have 
identified the following four intervals: 
1. € 0 – 4  
2. € 4 – 8 
3. € 8 – 12 
4. > € 12 
 
In order to allocate responses to one of the above categories, the following choice was 
offered (presented to the respondent in this format): 
 
 A 
(group 4) 
B 
(group 3) 
C 
(group 2) 
D 
(group 1) 
Departure time TD TD – 15 min. TD – 30 min. TD – 45 min. 
Travel time Tf Tf + 15 min. Tf + 30 min. Tf + 45 min. 
Arrival time TA TA TA TA 
Toll € 6 € 3 € 1 € 0 
 
The respondent was then asked to allocate ten trips over these four alternatives. If the 
respondent chooses alternative C over D, we can infer that he is willing to pay € 1 to 
save 15 minutes of travel time (implying a VOT of at least € 4 per hour). In order to 
calculate a point estimate for an individual we do need a mean interval value. It is not 
plausible to assume that the exact values are the middle points of its interval (and this is 
not possible for the fourth interval). Therefore we hypothesize that there is an 
underlying statistical distribution that can be fitted to the actual aggregated trip 
allocation of the point estimate questions and approximate the mean interval values 
based on this presumed distribution. We have chosen to use the Gamma distribution. In 
order to find the parameters of the best fitting Gamma distribution, we have applied the 
least square method (minimum difference between actual and simulated distribution). 
When the parameters have been estimated, it is possible to determine the mean interval 
values. Furthermore, it appeared that the distributions were (slightly) different for 
income; the mean interval value depends on the income of the respondent. The table 
below presents the mean average values for VOT, VSDE, VSDL and VUNC for the 
different income groups.  
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VOT VSDE Income (gross yearly) 
0-4 4-8 8-12 >12 0-2 2-4 4-6 >6 
<28.500 € 2.4 5.9 9.8 18.5 1.1 2.9 4.9 9.6 
28.500-45.000 € 2.4 5.9 9.8 18.1 1.1 2.9 4.9 9.5 
45.000-68.000 € 2.7 6.0 9.9 17.6 1.1 2.9 4.9 9.5 
>68.000 € 2.7 6.0 9.9 17.9 1.1 2.9 4.9 9.5 
 
VSDL VUNC Income (gross yearly) 
0-8 0-3 3-6 6-9 >9 8-16 16-24 >24 
<28.500 € 3.5 1.6 4.4 7.3 13.4 11.7 19.7 44.1 
28.500-45.000 € 3.4 1.6 4.4 7.3 13.1 11.6 19.6 40.2 
45.000-68.000 € 3.5 1.6 4.4 7.3 13.3 11.6 19.7 40.2 
>68.000 € 3.2 1.6 4.4 7.3 12.9 11.6 19.6 38.9 
 
It is now possible to calculate a point estimate for an individual’s value of time as the 
weighted average of the intervals’ expected values, where the weights are determined 
by the trips allocated to that interval by the respondent. For instance, when a respondent 
with an income of less than 28.500€ allocates 5 trips to B and 5 trips to C a VOT point 
estimate of 7.8 results ((5*5.9+5*9.8)/10). 
Below we show the alternatives that have been presented to the respondents in order 
to derive VSDE, VSDL and VUNC. 
Literature suggests that the VSDE is about half of the VOT. Therefore, we defined the 
following 4 intervals: 
1. € 0 – 2 
2. € 2 – 4 
3. € 4 – 6 
4. > € 6 
 
 A 
(group 4) 
B 
(group 3) 
C 
(group 2) 
D 
(group 1) 
Departure time TD TD – 15 min. TD – 30 min. TD – 45 min. 
Travel time Tf Tf Tf Tf 
Arrival time TA TA – 15 min. TA – 30 min. TA – 45 min. 
Toll € 3 € 1.50 € 0.50 € 0 
 
According to the literature VSDL is about twice the VOT. Therefore, we defined the 
following 4 intervals: 
1. € 0 – 8 
2. € 8 – 16 
3. € 16 – 24 
4. > € 24 
 
 A 
(group 4) 
B 
(group 3) 
C 
(group 2) 
D 
(group 1) 
Departure time TD TD + 10 min. TD + 20 min. TD + 30 min. 
Travel time Tf Tf Tf Tf 
Arrival time TA TA + 10 min. TA + 20 min. TA + 30 min. 
Toll € 8 € 4 € 1.33 € 0 
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We have defined, rather arbitrarily, the following intervals for the VUNC: 
1. € 0 – 3 
2. € 3 – 6 
3. € 6 – 9 
4. > € 9 
 
 A 
(group 4) 
B 
(group 3) 
C 
(group 2) 
D 
(group 1) 
Departure time TD – 30 min. TD – 30 min. TD – 30 min. TD – 30 min. 
Min. travel time Tf + 30 min. Tf + 5 min. Tf   + 0 min. Tf 
Max. travel time Tf + 30 min. Tf + 35 min. Tf + 40 min. Tf + 55 min. 
Min. arrival time TA TA – 15 min. TA – 30 min. TA – 45 min. 
Max. arrival time TA TA + 5 min. TA + 10 min. TA + 15 min. 
Tol € 6 € 3 € 1 € 0 
 
 
The resulting average values for the VOT, the VSDE, the VSDL, and the VUNC for 
the different income groups are shown in the following Table. 
 
 VOT VSDE VSDL VUNC 
<28.500 € 9.9 4.6 18.6 5.8 
28.500-45.000 € 9.2 4.3 14.9 5.0 
45.000-68.000 € 9.8 4.7 13.6 5.3 
>68.000 € 10.5 5.0 12.6 5.2 
 
European Transport \ Trasporti Europei  n. 32 (2006): 69-94 
 90
Appendix 4A: Percentage of respondents ranking measures and revenue use as 
‘unacceptable’ or ‘very unacceptable’  
 
Type of Measure % of respondents Type of revenue use % of 
respondents 
Measure 1A 
Measure 1B 
Measure 1C 
Measure 1D 
53,6 
51,5 
52,9 
55,9 
Measure 2A 
Measure 2B 
Measure 2C 
Measure 2D 
Measure 2E 
Measure 2F 
Measure 2G 
52,3 
50,0 
28,6 
48,3 
35,5 
37,2 
53,9 
Measure 3A 
Measure 3B 
Measure 3C 
Measure 3D 
Measure 3E 
Measure 3F 
Measure 3G 
Measure 3H 
Measure 3I 
59,3 
75,0 
81,5 
55,2 
48,6 
60,6 
13,6 
18,0 
32,3 
General budget 
New roads 
Improve public transport 
Abandon existing car taxation 
Lower fuel taxes 
Lower income taxes 
74,3 
8,6 
31,0 
3,2 
5,3 
33,5 
 
 
Appendix 4B: Mean of acceptance scores on each type of revenue use for four 
different income categories (level 1 = very unacceptable; level 7 = very acceptable) 
 
Allocation type 
<28,500 € 
(N=140) 
28,500-45,000 € 
(N=179) 
45,000-68,000 € 
(N=152) 
>68,000 € 
(N=93) 
General budget 2.27 2.11 2.11 2.09 
New roads 4.97 5.11 5.26 5.62 
Improve public transport 4.08 3.88 4.11 3.86 
Abandon existing car 
taxation 
5.84 5.77 5.97 5.79 
Lower fuel taxes 5.66 5.57 5.67 5.36 
Lower income taxes 4.22 3.85 3.75 3.50 
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Appendix 5: Ordered probit analysis with revenue use only as a dependent 
variable 
Variable Revenue use: general budget Revenue use: new roads 
Revenue use: improve 
public transport 
Threshold (µ’s) 
µ1 
µ2 
µ3 
µ4 
µ5 
µ6 
 
-3.51E-02 (.288)
.728 (.289) 
.987 (.290) 
1.259 (.292) 
1.783 (.299) 
2.674 (.351) 
Significance 
 
** 
*** 
*** 
*** 
*** 
 
-2.712 (.297) 
-2.186 (.283) 
-1.784 (.278) 
-1.345 (.275) 
-.691 (.272) 
.492 (.272) 
Significance 
*** 
*** 
*** 
*** 
** 
* 
 
-.510 (.268) 
.167 (.267) 
.406 (.267) 
.734 (.268) 
1.332 (.270) 
2.030 (.276) 
Significance 
*** 
*** 
*** 
*** 
** 
* 
Income (gross yearly) 
  Income 1 (less than €28.500) 
  Income 2 (€28.500-€45.000) 
  Income 3 (€45.000-€68.000) 
Gender (female) 
Loc1 
Age 
  Age1 (18-25) 
  Age2 (26-35) 
  Age3 (36-45) 
  Age4 (46-55) 
Yearly driven number of kilometers 
Comp1 (no transport costs paid by 
employer) 
Comp2 (transport costs partly 
compensated) 
Weight1 (low weight) 
Weight2 (middle weight) 
VOT 
 
6.74E-02 (.151)
4.31E-04 (.143)
-2.07E-02 (.147)
7.94E-02 (.151)
-.136 (.125) 
 
4.65E-02 (.249)
-7.72E-02 (.195)
-.151 (.200) 
-4.49E-02 (.210)
-2.67E-02 (.000)
-.447 (.166) 
-.203 (.108) 
.155 (.195) 
.168 (.163) 
2.20E-02 (.010)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*** 
* 
 
 
** 
 
-.451 (.145) 
-.360 (.137) 
-.265 (.140) 
-.137 (.115) 
7.236E-03 (.116)
 
-.490 (.240) 
-.275 (.195) 
-.324 (.192) 
-.407 (.202) 
-1.129E-06 (.000)
-.128 (.152) 
-.179 (.102) 
-1.984E-02 (.249)
9.005E-02 (.151)
9.026E-02 (.009)
 
*** 
*** 
* 
 
 
 
** 
 
* 
** 
 
 
* 
 
 
 
 
8.66E-02 (.142) 
1.163E-02 (.134) 
.129 (.137) 
3.342E-02 (.113) 
6.312E-02 (.115) 
 
-.257 (.236) 
-7.023E-02 (.184)
-.149 (.188) 
-.236 (.197) 
1.930E-06 (.000) 
-.104 (.151) 
-.152 (.100) 
.544 (.180) 
.354 (.180) 
2.24E-02 (.009) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*** 
** 
** 
N  564  564  564  
Log-likelihood -795.618 ** -899.676 ** -1054.943 ** 
Pseudo R-square Cox and Snell
Nagelkerke 
McFadden 
.035 
.037 
.012 
Cox and Snell 
Nagelkerke 
McFadden 
.051 
.053 
.016 
Cox and Snell 
Nagelkerke 
McFadden 
.044 
.045 
.012 
 
Variable 
Revenue use: abandon 
existing car taxation 
Revenue use: lower 
 fuel taxes 
Revenue use: lower income 
taxes  
Threshold (µ’s) 
µ1 
µ2 
µ3 
µ4 
µ5 
µ6 
 
-2.324 (.317) 
-1.854 (.295) 
-1.660 (.290) 
-1.154 (.284) 
-.586 (.281) 
.504 (.281) 
Significance 
 
** 
*** 
*** 
*** 
*** 
 
-2.233 (.299) 
-1.771 (.286) 
-1.487 (.282) 
-1.107 (.279) 
-.598 (.277) 
.622 (.277) 
Significance 
*** 
*** 
*** 
*** 
** 
** 
 
-.715 (.270) 
.169 (.267) 
.468 (.268) 
.797 (.268) 
1.304 (.270) 
2.121 (.278) 
Significance 
*** 
 
* 
*** 
*** 
*** 
Income (gross yearly) 
  Income 1 (less than €28.500) 
  Income 2 (€28.500-€45.000) 
  Income 3 (€45.000-€68.000) 
Gender (female) 
Loc1 
Age 
  Age1 (18-25) 
  Age2 (26-35) 
  Age3 (36-45) 
  Age4 (46-55) 
Yearly driven number of kilometers 
Comp1 (no transport costs paid by employer) 
Comp2 (transport costs partly compensated) 
Weight1 (low weight) 
Weight2 (middle weight) 
VOT 
 
1.21E-02 (.148) 
-3.73E-02 (.139)
.180 (.144) 
-2.86E-02 (.118)
-7.317E-02 (.120)
 
-.430 (.246) 
-.221 (.194) 
-7.54E-02 (.199)
-6.23E-02 (.209)
1.17E-06 (.000) 
.411 (.159) 
.249 (.105) 
-.199 (.187) 
-3.52E-02 (.156)
4.85E-03 (.010)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* 
 
 
 
 
*** 
** 
 
 
 
 
.174 (.146) 
.171 (.137) 
.297 (.141) 
3.323E-02 (.117)
-.242 (.118) 
 
-5.82E-02 (.244)
-4.95E-02 (.191)
-.129 (.195) 
2.18E-02 (.205)
-1.43E-06 (.000)
.436 (.158) 
.120 (.103) 
-.506 (.187) 
-.284 (.156) 
4.87E-03 (.010)
 
 
 
** 
 
** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*** 
 
*** 
* 
 
 
.421 (.142) 
.225 (.134) 
.241 (.137) 
6.70E-02 (.113) 
-.287 (.115) 
 
.456 (.236) 
.449 (.185) 
.374 (.189) 
7.03E-02 (.198) 
-2.660E-06 (.000) 
9.84E-02 (.150) 
-6.45E-02 (.100) 
2.80E-03 (.179) 
7.56E-02 (.179) 
1.24E-02 (.009) 
 
*** 
* 
* 
 
** 
 
 
* 
** 
** 
* 
 
 
 
 
N  564  564  564  
Log-likelihood -777.800 * -830.182 ** -1041.136 *** 
Pseudo R-square Cox and Snell 
Nagelkerke 
McFadden 
.040 
.043 
.015 
Cox and Snell
Nagelkerke 
McFadden 
.045 
.048 
.015 
Cox and Snell 
Nagelkerke 
McFadden 
.062 
.063 
.017 
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Appendix 6A: Results of ordered probit analysis with the acceptance of measure 1 
as the dependent variable 
Variable Probit ACC measure 1 Sign. 
Threshold (µ’s) 
µ1 
µ2 
µ3 
µ4 
µ5 
µ6 
 
1.073 (.450) 
2.309 (.456) 
2.781 (.458) 
3.136 (.461) 
4.036 (.469) 
5.564 (.538) 
 
** 
*** 
*** 
*** 
*** 
*** 
Gross yearly income 
VOT 
Gender  (female) 
Education (Edu1 (primary school) = base) 
  Edu2 (junior general sec.) 
  Edu3 (intermediate vocational) 
  Edu4 (senior general sec.) 
  Edu5 (Bachelor) 
  Edu6 (Master) 
Loc1 (3 large cities) 
Childyes 
Age (age5 (56+) = base) 
  Age1 (18-25) 
  Age2 (26-35) 
  Age3 (36-45) 
  Age4 (46-55) 
Travel time in congestion/free flow tt 
Type of measure (measure 1D = base) 
  M1A (charge of € 1)  
  M1B (charge of € 2 during peak) 
  M1C (peak time charge) 
Number of kilometres driven yearly 
Compensation of costs by employer (full compensation = base) 
  Comp1 (no transport costs paid by employer) 
  Comp2 (transport costs partly compensated) 
Vehicle weight (Weight3 (heavy weight) = base) 
  Weight1 (low weight) 
  Weight2 (middle weight) 
General effectiveness (less congestion) (Geff1 = base) 
  Geff2 
  Geff3  
  Geff4 
  Geff5 
  Geff6 
  Geff7 
Personal effectiveness (drive less yourself) (peff1 = base) 
  Peff2 
  Peff3 
  Peff4 
  Peff5 
  Peff6 
  Peff7 
8.58 E-03 (.019) 
4.26 E-02 (.010) 
-.166 (.121) 
 
.245 (.232) 
.168 (.156) 
.414 (.198) 
.413 (.152) 
.739 (.191) 
-.197 (.121) 
9.92E-02 (.112) 
 
-.257 (.250) 
-9.48E-02 (.199) 
-4.91E-02 (.208) 
-.184 (.209) 
6.25E-02 (.075) 
 
.168 (.136) 
.167 (.128) 
.134 (.133) 
-2.92E-06 (.000) 
 
-.310 (.163) 
-9.93E-02 (.108) 
 
.167 (.189) 
.221 (.159) 
 
.774 (.149) 
1.107 (.185) 
1.554 (.236) 
1.765 (.185) 
2.145 (.262) 
1.859 (.497) 
 
354 (.128) 
.539 (.199) 
.212 (.196) 
.360 (.185) 
.447 (.230) 
2.92E-02 (.433) 
 
*** 
 
 
 
 
** 
*** 
*** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* 
 
* 
 
 
 
 
 
*** 
*** 
*** 
*** 
*** 
*** 
 
*** 
*** 
 
* 
* 
 
N  564  
Log-likelihood -815.555 *** 
Pseudo R-square Cox and Snell 
Nagelkerke 
McFadden 
.379 
.393 
.142 
Notes: The standard errors are shown in brackets. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 
1% level, respectively, (two-sided t-test). 
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Appendix 6B: Results of ordered probit analysis with the acceptance of measure 2 
as the dependent variable 
Variable Probit ACC measure 2 Sign. 
Threshold (µ’s) 
µ1 
µ2 
µ3 
µ4 
µ5 
µ6 
 
-.263 (.443) 
.609 (.444) 
.943 (.445) 
1.267 (.445) 
1.898 (.448) 
3.073 (.461) 
 
 
 
** 
*** 
*** 
*** 
Gross yearly income 
Gender (female) 
Education (Edu1 (primary school) = base) 
  Edu2 (junior general sec.) 
  Edu3 (intermediate vocational) 
  Edu4 (senior general sec.) 
  Edu5 (Bachelor) 
  Edu6 (Baster) 
Loc1 (3 large cities) 
Childyes 
Age (Age5 (56+) = base) 
  Age1 (18-25) 
  Age2 (26-35) 
  Age3 (36-45) 
  Age4 (46-55) 
Travel time in congestion/free flow tt 
Type of measure (measure 2G = base) 
  M2A (revenues to general budget) 
  M2B (traffic system in general) 
  M2C (lower car taxes and new roads) 
  M2D (public transport) 
  M2E (abandon existing ownership tax) 
  M2F (lower existing fuel taxes) 
Number of kilometres driven yearly 
Compensation of costs by employer (full compensation = base) 
  Comp1 (no transport costs paid by employer) 
  Comp2 (transport costs partly compensated) 
Vehicle weight (Weight3 (heavy weight) = base) 
  Weight1 (low weight) 
  Weight2 (middle weight) 
VOT 
General effectiveness (less congestion) (Geff1 = base) 
  Geff2 
  Geff3  
  Geff4 
  Geff5 
  Geff6 
  Geff7 
Personal effectiveness (drive less yourself) (Peff1 = base) 
  Peff2 
  Peff3 
  Peff4 
  Peff5 
  Peff6 
  Peff7 
-2.51E-02 (.019) 
-7.49E-02 (.119) 
 
-.115 (.223) 
8.12E-02 (.151) 
.213 (.193) 
.260 (.149) 
.424 (.184) 
-7.00E-02 (.119) 
1.23E-02 (.110) 
 
-8.21E-02 (.245) 
-.289 (.199) 
-.204 (.206) 
-.255 (.207) 
2.05E-02 (.073) 
 
-.139 (.173) 
-2.69E-02 (.178) 
.469 (.176) 
.138 (.172) 
.471 (.177) 
.524 (.176) 
-2.55E-06 (.000) 
 
-.372 (.160) 
-.246 (.106) 
 
.187 (.187) 
.131 (.156) 
2.37E-02 (.010) 
 
.637 (.139) 
.887 (.168) 
.846 (.193) 
1.216 (.184) 
1.258 (.275) 
2.287 (.790) 
 
.275 (.138) 
.400 (.180) 
.187 (.189) 
.420 (.187) 
.242 (.244) 
-.204 (.316) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* 
** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*** 
 
*** 
*** 
 
 
** 
** 
 
 
 
** 
 
*** 
*** 
*** 
*** 
*** 
*** 
 
** 
** 
 
** 
 
 
N  564  
Log-likelihood -935.406 *** 
Pseudo R-square Cox and Snell 
Nagelkerke 
McFadden 
.272 
.280 
.087 
Notes: The standard errors are shown in brackets. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 
1% level, respectively, (two-sided t-test). 
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Appendix 6C: Results of ordered probit analysis with the acceptance of measure 3 
as the dependent variable 
Variable Probit ACC measure 3 Sign. 
Threshold (µ’s) 
µ1 
µ2 
µ3 
µ4 
µ5 
µ6 
 
-2.43E-02 (.440) 
.960 (.441) 
1.331 (.442) 
1.728 (.444) 
2.325 (.447) 
3.405 (.459) 
 
 
** 
*** 
*** 
*** 
*** 
Gross yearly income 
Gender (female) 
Education (Edu1 (primary school) = base) 
  Edu2 (junior general sec.) 
  Edu3 (intermediate vocational) 
  Edu4 (senior general sec.) 
  Edu5 (Bachelor) 
  Edu6 (Master) 
Loc1 (3 large cities) 
Childyes 
Age (Age5 (56+) = base) 
  Age1 (18-25) 
  Age2 (26-35) 
  Age3 (36-45) 
  Age4 (46-55) 
Travel time in congestion/free flow tt 
Charge level for measure 3 (2.5 €cents = base) 
  Charge=5 €cents (dummy) 
  Charge=7.5 €cents (dummy) 
Revenue use for measure 3 (unclear = base) 
  Revenue use is new roads (dummy) 
  Revenue use is abandon car taxes (dummy) 
Number of kilometres driven yearly 
Compensation of costs by employer (full compensation = base) 
  Comp1 (no transport costs paid by employer) 
  Comp2 (transport costs partly compensated) 
Vehicle weight (Weight3 (heavy weight) = base) 
  Weight1 (low weight) 
  Weight2 (middle weight) 
VOT 
General effectiveness (less congestion) (Geff1 = base) 
  Geff2 
  Geff3  
  Geff4 
  Geff5 
  Geff6 
  Geff7 
Personal effectiveness (drive less yourself) (Peff1 = base) 
  Peff2 
  Peff3 
  Peff4 
  Peff5 
  Peff6 
  Peff7 
1.06E-02 (.019) 
-.3.05E-02 (.120) 
 
-.156 (.233) 
8.14E-02 (.154) 
8.38E-02 (.196) 
.280 (.151) 
.194 (.187) 
-5.31E-02 (.122) 
-7.00E-02 (.111) 
 
-.102 (.251) 
-.129 (.201) 
-9.25E-02 (.208) 
-.218 (.210) 
4.58E-03 (.074) 
 
-.273 (.114) 
-.536 (.115) 
 
.270 (.118) 
1.235 (.123) 
-2.15E-06 (.000) 
 
-.358 (.163) 
-.180 (.106) 
 
-.520 (.189) 
-.335 (.157) 
1.84E-02 (.010) 
 
1.050 (.159) 
1.230 (.185) 
1.090 (.218) 
1.605 (.205) 
1.779 (.284) 
.650 (.652) 
 
4.23E-02 (.149) 
-2.56E-02 (.202) 
.150 (.198) 
8.76E-02 (.204) 
9.21E-02 (.247) 
-.276 (.351) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
** 
*** 
 
** 
*** 
 
 
** 
* 
 
*** 
** 
* 
 
 
*** 
*** 
*** 
*** 
*** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
N  564  
Log-likelihood -873.327 *** 
Pseudo R-square Cox and Snell 
Nagelkerke 
McFadden 
.408 
.419 
.145 
Notes: The standard errors are shown in brackets. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 
1% level, respectively, (two-sided t-test). 
 
